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
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
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STUDENT REPORT

SPETSNAZ: A SOVIET SABOTAGE THREAT

MAJOR BURTON A. CASTEEL, JR. 86-0500

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PREFACE

This paper was written at the request of the Director, Directorate of Counterintelligence, Air Force Office of Special Investigations, Washington DC. It will be used as background to help develop plans and tactics to counter the sabotage threat to USAF resources.

The purpose of this project was to provide a benchmark and realistic view of the sabotage threat posed by the elite forces of the Soviet Union--SPETsNAZ. SPETsNAZ represents a real and significant threat to the United States Air Force, whether at home or on foreign soil. The Soviets have dedicated significant resources toward these forces in order for them to accomplish their mission. Likewise, we have to expend a similar effort to counter this threat.

There is a paucity of unclassified public source information available on SPETsNAZ and the extremes to which they will go to complete their tasks. Nevertheless, this paper synthesizes what little information is available into a product which will provide a basic understanding of SPETsNAZ sabotage doctrine, their structure, objectives, deployment and employment. This paper, however, purposely avoids specific locations, vulnerabilities, or possible counter actions and fixes; to do so would possibly impinge on classified information.

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ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Major Burton A. Casteel, Jr., a member of the Air Command and Staff College Class of 1986, began his military career upon graduation from high school in 1960. After twelve years as an enlisted member, he applied and was accepted for the Airman's Education and Commissioning Program (AECF). In 1972 he graduated with honors from Michigan State University with a Bachelor of Arts degree in Political Science. Since his commissioning in 1973, he has served as a special agent with the Air Force Office of Special Investigations (AFOSI). After an initial assignment at Patrick AFB, Florida, he served four years in Wiesbaden, Germany, as a counterintelligence and counterespionage case officer. In 1978 he was reassigned to Offutt AFB, Nebraska, as Chief, Counterintelligence Operations Division, AFOSI District 13. Three years later he was assigned as Commander, AFOSI Detachment 1340, Offutt AFB. The next year Major Casteel became the first AFOSI counterintelligence liaison representative to Headquarters Strategic Air Command. He left Offutt AFB the following year to serve a tour at Headquarters AFOSI in Washington, DC. During that assignment he served as an inspector and team chief for the AFOSI Inspector General. He has completed Squadron Officers School by both correspondence and in residence, and has completed Air Command and Staff College by correspondence. He also has a masters degree from Ball State University.

Major Casteel became interested in the Soviet threat after his initial assignment to AFOSI in 1967. Upon his acceptance to AECF at Michigan State University, he quickly chose his major area of study--the Soviet Union. He has furthered his studies on the Soviet Union and their activities through attendance at USAF professional schools and a professional reading program.

Major Casteel steadfastly believes the Soviet Union represents a clear and present danger to world peace and freedom, and will do everything within their power to attain their primary objective--world domination. To prevent this from occurring requires strong, intelligent, and active preventative measures.

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REPORT NUMBER

86-0500

AUTHOR(S)

MAJOR BURTON A. CASTEEL, JR., USAF

TITLE

SPETsNAZ: A SOVIET SABOTAGE THREAT

I. Purpose: Provide a benchmark and realistic view of the sabotage threat posed by the elite forces of the Soviet Union--SPETsNAZ.

II. Objectives: This paper has five objectives. First, review Soviet sabotage doctrine and identify the players. Second, review historical Soviet operations where sabotage played a key role. Third, review the organization of SPETsNAZ, examine their tactics, and identify a list of possible targets for sabotage. Fourth, describe SPETsNAZ training and detail the various sabotage methods they can use. Lastly, this paper poses a question. Are we ready, willing, and able to counter this Soviet threat?

This paper is limited by the scant amount of unclassified information in public source documents on SPETsNAZ. However, that information has been synthesized into a product providing an insight into SPETsNAZ sabotage activity.

III. Data: The USSR is committed to the destruction of capitalism and will use every political tool to accomplish this end, including war.

Soviet doctrine has adopted a more indirect approach--targeting or hitting an enemy where he least expects it or can afford it,

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by using special troops--SPETsNAZ. Their strategic mission is to operate at the rear echelon levels of the enemy. There, SPETsNAZ would carry out acts designed to weaken the enemy's ability to carry on its military and political functions through sabotage. The expertise with which SPETsNAZ sabotage units carry out their mission is amply demonstrated by the capture of Prague, Czechoslovakia, in 1968, and their ruthless assassination of President Amin in Kabul, Afghanistan, in December 1979.

The organization of SPETsNAZ is straight-forward. They are special forces of the GRU. Their estimated strength in peacetime is between 27,000 and 30,000. They operate with every Soviet army and naval fleet.

Conducting operations behind enemy lines has generated considerable attention from Soviet military planners, tacticians, and strategists. They have created a force of such size, it is unequal to any other in prosecuting special operations behind the lines. Infiltrating SPETsNAZ forces into enemy territory, in a non-nuclear environment, would more than likely be under various ruses. These could be as members of sporting teams, cultural groups, businessmen, delegations, or as passengers or crews of merchant ships or civil aircraft. The use of sleeper, deep cover, or in-place SPETsNAZ sabotage agents in enemy country would facilitate SPETsNAZ activity.

Soviet defectors differ concerning what the order of priorities will be once SPETsNAZ units have been inserted into enemy territory. However, targeting and destroying nuclear facilities and their means of delivery, command and communication centers, enemy airfields and aircraft, plus the assassination of key military leaders are but a few of the SPETsNAZ sabotage targets.

The training SPETsNAZ troops undertake is arduous and extensive. They are trained in foreign languages of Western Europe. Other courses consist of parachute training, demolition, survival, infiltration methods, sabotage, and assassination techniques. To give the sabotage training as much realism as possible, the Soviets have constructed full-scale models of key targets. Examples of the types of full-scale models include: the Ground Launched Cruise Missile, Lance and Pershing II missiles; allied

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aircraft like the Mirage IV and Jaguars; and, nuclear storage sites, air defense installations, and airfields. There are about 150 SPETsNAZ sabotage groups trained to operate in Western Europe.

The methods of sabotage SPETsNAZ forces are trained in are varied. The use of incendiaries, explosives, acids and abrasives, biological, chemical, and nuclear weapons, plus assassination, are some examples of the tools available.

IV. Conclusion: The Soviets have a multitude of diverse sabotage methods they could, and would, employ from pre-hostilities through conflict resolution. SPETsNAZ training in employing and exploiting these methods are comprehensive and well supported. They have displayed a willingness to use sabotage in the past, and no doubt will use it in the future. To believe the Soviets would not employ all manner of sabotage available to them leads to a false sense of security and a denial of Soviet doctrine.

V. Comments: Are we ready, willing, and able to counter this threat? Thwarting the SPETsNAZ sabotage threat requires a realistic countersabotage doctrine, complimented by definitive guidance, and "living" action plans. That approach, coupled with continuing education of security forces on sabotage methods, tactics, and means of detection, should be linked to training in anti-sabotage procedures. The establishment of a viable source system tailored toward identifying the sabotage threat is requisite to countering that type of activity. This represents a beginning. Countering the SPETsNAZ sabotage threat requires research and action. We must be ready, willing, and able.

CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

The USSR is committed to the destruction of capitalism and the establishment, worldwide, of its own brand of socialism--eventually to develop, it is hoped, into communism. Any and every political tool will be employed to accomplish this end including, where it is convenient, war (12:35).

The Soviets have shown their commitment to worldwide domination by their steady, continual, and apparently unending growth in the military establishment and the production of armaments. In overall manpower and quantity of weaponry, the Soviet Union is unequaled. The Soviet Union recognizes the primary obstacle standing in its way of becoming master of the world is the military force represented by the United States and its allies, particularly the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) alliance. To be successful in the pursuit of world domination the Soviets would have to systematically destroy the capability of the US and its allies, both politically and militarily. An all-out nuclear strike by the Soviet Union, would, in all likelihood, bring a similar retaliatory response by the US and its allies, probably resulting in the end of civilization as we know it. This would not serve the Soviet objective of world domination. The intention of this project is to look at a capability the Soviet Union possess that facilitates their world domination quest without the retaliation consequences: a capability which is far more subtle, but just as deadly--sabotage.

The art of sabotage, as practiced by the various organs of the Soviet armed forces, security, and intelligence forces is a viable threat to the US and her allies. This threat applies not only to the military capability of the US, but also extends to the civilian environment as well. The Soviets define sabotage (diversiva) as the "clandestine activities performed by specially trained groups, consisting in the destruction of enemy personnel and demolition of enemy objects, for the purpose of inflicting material losses on the enemy and undermining his morale (32:68)." The Soviet Union has dedicated, military and intelligence, personnel who have been specifically trained for a sabotage role, whether it be in pre-hostilities or through conflict resolution. This project explores some of the sabotage

capabilities of the Soviet Union with emphasis on the Soviet Army Special Operations Forces--SPETsNAZ.

This project has been limited by the paucity of unclassified information and is based solely on information derived from public source documents. Although this could be a slight shortfall, the intent of this project is to provide a realistic baseline view on the SPETsNAZ sabotage capability and how they go about doing their business. Also, the awareness created by using open sources can serve to alert the public to this potential Soviet menace. Although references will be made to other Soviet organizations with sabotage missions, their roles will not be fully addressed as it would exceed the scope of this project.

In order to understand the basis of Soviet capability, Chapter Two, "A Prelude to Death and Destruction," examines Soviet doctrine to familiarize the reader with Soviet concepts and perspectives as to why sabotage has to be conducted to achieve their goal--world domination. It also identifies the main players in this role.

The Soviet's use of sabotage in pursuit of their goal is described in Chapter Three, "Operations of the Past." This chapter not only looks at the importance of partisan activities, but also describes the Soviet's use of SPETsNAZ forces and their sabotage actions during the initial invasions of Czechoslovakia and Afghanistan.

The organization of SPETsNAZ and their tactics is the topic of Chapter Four, "A Structure For Infiltration and Mayhem." This chapter is particularly important because it describes some of the methods SPETsNAZ sabotage forces use to gain entry into enemy territory and identifies their potential targets.

Chapter Five, "Preparing For, and Doing, Dirty Deeds," provides insight to SPETsNAZ sabotage training. Also included in this chapter are examples of the various tools they can use in carrying out their sabotage activities.

The final chapter, Chapter Six, "Are We Ready, Willing, and Able?" is devoted to asking some basic questions about our readiness in the face of the Soviet sabotage threat. Will we recognize it for what it is? Can we prevent it? What will we do if it happens? These are merely some of the questions we need to ask. But moreover, can we answer these questions and the others that need to be asked? Provoking some thought to this Soviet capability will hopefully increase the awareness of the reader to this threat, and spawn some research, and defensive or preventative actions, should they be needed.

CHAPTER TWO

A PRELUDE TO DEATH AND DESTRUCTION

We have never rejected terror on principle--Lenin was to write in 1901--nor can we ever do so. Terror is a form of military operation that may be usefully applied, or may even be essential in certain moments of the battle--the point is, however, that terror is now advocated, not as one of the operations which in the field must carry on in close contact with the main body and in harmony with the whole plan of battle, but as an individual attack, completely isolated from any army whatever. . . (8:89).

These words, written by Lenin in May 1901, were directed toward developing a concept of military and political doctrine during a time of contemplated revolution. Although Lenin used the word "terror", he could have just as easily substituted the word "sabotage" and conveyed the same context of thought. Even though the times and the machines for carrying out war have changed, the basic Soviet tenet of sabotage still remains. It is still a form of military operation that must be usefully applied, advocated, and be carried out in harmony with the whole plan of battle.

SABOTAGE DOCTRINE

With the advent of newer and more sophisticated weapons systems, the indirect approach--targeting or hitting your enemy where he least expects it or can afford it, has become an integral component of doctrine which can sometimes be related to Soviet strategic policy. Very little change has occurred since Khrushchev left power with regard to targeting.

The main emphasis is still on Counterforce--the destruction of the enemy's means of nuclear attack. This means that the destruction of the United States' nuclear forces, especially their strategic nuclear forces [ICBMs and SLBMs], their armed forces, economic base, command and control system, and system of governmental and military control must be wiped out (1:272).

In a speech delivered to the United Nations Special Session on disarmament in June 1982, Brezhnev made a declaration that the Soviet Union would not be the first to use nuclear weapons against an opponent (1:306). Despite this professed defensive posture, an age old paranoia of the Soviets remains--the surprise attack by the West. Maintaining a threshold below strategic nuclear war is suggested by Soviet pre-emptive strike strategy as reflected in this statement:

To repulse a surprise enemy attack, a certain portion of Soviet troops daily carry out guard duty. . . . It is not surprising that the troops who are on patrol are called the first echelon, which are immediately ordered into battle with the enemy in order to frustrate his plans (1:305).

The concentration on an enemy's plans would seem to indicate the very strong possibility of pre-emption in some manner. Fear of a strategic, or unlimited, nuclear war by two adversaries could give way to the more possible confrontation in the tactical nuclear or possibly the conventional arena. Soviet doctrine relates to a new Soviet strategy of destroying the bulk of NATO's tactical nuclear weapons using special operational maneuver groups operating closely with Soviet forward divisions (13:253-254; 22:3; 27:4-5 - 4-6). By destroying the NATO weapons prior to the advent of all-out hostilities, Soviet strategy implies they could possibly dissuade NATO from using its remaining nuclear forces because of superior Soviet theater nuclear capability (1:306). The most likely means of accomplishing this pre-emption would be through the use of the Soviet Special Operations Forces or Special Purpose Forces--SPETsNAZ. This term is taken from the Russian "spetsialnoye nazvanie" meaning forces of special designation (15:7), or "spetsialnoye naznachenie" meaning special purpose (35: 1). SPETsNAZ forces work under the control of the Soviet General Staff's Main Intelligence Directorate (GRU--Glavnoe Razvedyvatelnoe Upravlenie) out of the 2nd Chief Directorate (1:111-112; 15:28).

The SPETsNAZ mission is to conduct what the Soviets call special reconnaissance (spetsialnaya razvedka). This is defined as:

Reconnaissance carried out to subvert the political, economic, and military potential and morale of a probable or actual enemy. The primary missions of special reconnaissance are: acquiring intelligence on major economic and military installations and either destroying them or putting them out of action; organizing sabotage and acts of subversion; carrying out punitive operations against rebels. . . . Special reconnaissance is [accomplished]. . . by the forces of covert intelligence and special purpose troops (35:1).

The stringent security requirements imposed by the Soviets associated with sensitive SPETsNAZ missions have offered only limited doctrinal writings into this area of military affairs. However, in the fulfillment of the requirements of Soviet strategy and military doctrine, SPETsNAZ missions could be listed as strategic, operational, and tactical (1:105).

The strategic mission of SPETsNAZ is to operate at the rear echelon levels of the enemy, deep within his own territory. There, SPETsNAZ units would engage in sabotage, assassination, espionage, reconnaissance, and other acts designed to weaken the enemy's ability to carry on its military and political functions. Furthermore, these thrusts would include efforts to intimidate and demoralize the public and further undermine national resistance. In essence, SPETsNAZ activity in this arena would be intended to weaken the enemy's combat effectiveness and operational readiness. In the operational area, SPETsNAZ units would operate on a smaller scale than in the strategic arena. They are likely to operate 350-1000 kilometers from the front's area of operation or the forward edge of battle. Their primary objective would be to initially neutralize or destroy the enemy's nuclear means within their area of operation. Furthermore, they would conduct sabotage operations against prime military targets such as airfields, communications systems, radar control centers, and railway systems, as well as roads and other targets of opportunity. Tactical missions by SPETsNAZ are conducted in support of division-sized units and are relatively akin to those in the operational area, but to a lesser degree and depth of thrust (18:43-46; 22:3, 54).

THE PLAYERS

Soviet special operations forces are not limited to strictly regular military units.

As noted in the history of these operations, primacy of place has belonged to the intelligence and security services and still does today. Traditionally, state security figures uniquely in Soviet military power; it operates an armed force in its own right, and it performs a Party-assigned role of military counterintelligence. . . . Through such instruments the KGB [Committee for State Security, komitet gosudarstvennoi bezopasnosti] retains a capability to conduct its own special operations and maintain a Party-sanctioned oversight of special operations assigned to the military (1:107).

The KGB has armed forces performing many varied functions.

such as counterintelligence, counterinsurgency operations, counterquerrilla actions, and border guard responsibility to mention a few. Many of these functions are considered in the special missions or special departments arenas. Special operations are an area wherein the KGB is intimately involved. "Within the First Chief Directorate [Foreign Operations], a 'wet affairs,' or 'executive actions,' department has been connected with assassinations, kidnappings, sabotage, and other direct actions for decades (1:109)." Although the KGB is considered to be assigned the most politically sensitive missions because of their political reliability, the question has not been laid to rest as to whether or not they exercise complete control over SPETsNAZ elements. It can be conjectured, however, that KGB elements would exercise some type of oversight role of SPETsNAZ (1:107-110).

In the succeeding chapter we will look at examples of Soviet operations involving SPETsNAZ and the tactics and methods they have employed. Particular attention will be directed toward examples of sabotage perpetrated by these forces during their operations; however, other key aspects of their methods of operation will not be excluded.

CHAPTER THREE

OPERATIONS OF THE PAST

During the war [The Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union] the partisans killed, wounded or took prisoner hundreds of thousands of German troops, collaborators, and officials of the occupation administration. They derailed more than 18,000 trains, and destroyed or damaged thousands of locomotives and tens of thousands of railway cars and cisterns. The partisan war affected the morale of the German Army, keeping the German troops in a constant state of fear (28:5-1).

PARTISAN ACTIVITY

There is not a specific mention to sabotage in this reference, but it is implicit by the results. The Soviets use of partisans to conduct sabotage operations in future conflicts should be a given, considering the results of their experiences of World War II. In a major conflict, particularly in NATO, SPETSNAZ forces are expected to organize and prosecute partisan warfare behind enemy lines. These actions would be supported by a coordinated effort with Warsaw Pact partisan aid. Their missions would be to sabotage nuclear storage facilities and launch sites, disrupt communications lines, conduct selective assassinations, and make surprise attacks on individual garrisons for the purpose of disorganizing the rear areas of the enemy (10:17-18; 25:45; 32:153). In addition, those airborne/airmobile troops who had completed their initial mission, subsequent to their insertion, and who could not be purposefully pulled out, would conduct sabotage with the support of the partisans. In fact, in World War II, the Soviets did just that following most of their airborne operations. The Soviets correctly assessed that there would not be any great recruiting potential for partisan fighters in a liberated Western Europe (15:29; 25:56).

Although sabotage has not been readily seen since World War II, there are two examples within the last twenty years wherein Soviet projection of its special forces have had significant impact on world events. These can best be illustrated by the Soviet action in 1968 with Czechoslovakia and again in 1979 with the invasion of Afghanistan.

When looking at these two events we must consider the actions taken by the Soviets in accomplishing their objective. In doing so we need to take a look at Soviet units involved in these actions, and the implications these units present for the future. Soviet doctrine does not just concentrate on the military capability of an adversary, but also its political and economic base as well (5:272).

THE CZECH EXPERIENCE

The events in Czechoslovakia are a prime example of the Soviet use of its elite forces. A special reconnaissance-sabotage unit of an airborne (SPETSNAZ) division took an active part in the capture of Prague in 1968. This action was under the orders and direction of the KGB (1:114). This reconnaissance-sabotage unit played an important role, as they had to secure the landing site for the Soviet division which would follow. Several days prior to the departure of these special forces, they were given detailed instructions as to what they were to do upon landing. To prepare for their operation they were shown a film of the Prague airport with the precise location of the defenses in the area. When these forces landed, each soldier knew what his objective was, based upon his prior briefings (20:3-4).

The Soviet's adroit planning was bold and aggressive and reflected the confidence placed in these troops. The actual capture of the Prague airport was prefaced on a ruse by the Soviets. As the initial invasion aircraft approached the airport, the pilot asked permission to land, claiming problems with his engines. Permission was given. After the aircraft landed and had begun to slow, the troops immediately jumped out of the aircraft and proceeded to their designated objectives. Initially, the soldiers disarmed the guards and then secured the airport. The aircraft which delivered these troops never stopped rolling and took off immediately when all the soldiers had deployed. Once the airport was secured, additional aircraft landed which brought in the main forces of the division. These forces commandeered cars, buses, and any other conveyance they came upon, and proceeded toward Prague (20:3-4).

Once they reached Prague, the troops quickly secured the main streets, bridges, and other important positions with minimum effort. They did not have to maintain sole control of Prague because they were rapidly re-enforced by other Soviet forces and Warsaw Pact forces. When Prague was secured by these elite forces, their job had not been completed. Under KGB direction, an element of these forces broke into the office of Alexander Dubcek, the First Secretary of the Communist Party, in the Central Committee building and announced they were taking Dubcek and his colleagues into custody. Dubcek was later taken.

via Soviet armored car, to a military aircraft and flown to Moscow (4:174-204). At the same time KGB units were working with local agents to secure political control throughout the country, agents were also sowing confusion and doubt especially among the military, thus limiting a Czech military response (1:115; 6:167).

THE KABUL AFFAIR

The same Soviet efficiency which was displayed in the Czechoslovak affair carried through to Kabul, Afghanistan, in December 1979. The Soviets placed SPETsNAZ airborne troops and GRU elements into Afghanistan months before the December event. These units, while working with Soviet military advisors to the Afghan army, devised several scenarios to negate or limit Afghan military capability in the capital. Furthermore, a Soviet Politburo decision was made to task the KGB to kill Hafizullah Amin, the President of Afghanistan. An initial attempt to poison him failed. However, during the coup on 26 December 1979, SPETsNAZ, in concert with the KGB, assaulted Amin's palace and killed him (1:115). "In the words of an Afghan survivor, 'the SPETsNAZ used weapons equipped with silencers and shot down their adversaries like professional killers.' After this, the SPETsNAZ secured Kabul Airport in preparation for the mass airlanding of airborne troops (35:5)." SPETsNAZ operations have also attempted to ambush Ahmed Shah Massoud, an Afghan rebel leader who has been successful against Soviet and Afghan Army forces. A SPETsNAZ operation in the Panjshir Valley reflected their ability to infiltrate enemy-held territory to support a helicopter ambush of freedom fighters (15:28-29).

SPETsNAZ forces have proven themselves to be well organized, well trained, ruthless, and reliable. Czechoslovakia and Afghanistan remain fitting examples of this fact. The SPETsNAZ, whatever the timing, or in whatever role the Soviet leadership direct, "... remain a considerable peacetime power projection asset and wartime force multiplier for a nation whose military philosophy stresses surprise, deception, and disruption as the handmaidens to the offense (15:29)."

CHAPTER FOUR

A BLUEPRINT FOR INFILTRATION AND MAYHEM

In order to understand the Soviet perspective, it is important to understand what they mean by operations and tactics and how they associate each concept. To the Soviet, operations mean that the action involves at least an army or a front which was tailored for the mission. Tactics consist of combat actions at division level or below. A front is the Soviets largest field formation in wartime (27:1-1 - 2: 2-1 - 2).

ORGANIZATION

The organization of SPETsNAZ is straight-forward. SPETsNAZ are the special forces of the GRU. Their estimated strength in peacetime is between 27,000 and 30,000; however, this does not include personnel who are temporarily detached for training, support, or other activities (7:68).

The independent SPETsNAZ company has 115 men, which include nine officers and 11 warrant officers. Every Soviet army has a SPETsNAZ company which consists of a headquarters element, three parachute platoons, a platoon for communications, and supporting sub-units. When prosecuting sabotage in the enemy's rear areas, the force may operate as a single entity, or in a small group of up to 15. There is no hard and fast rule regarding numbers in a team as flexibility is necessary. Should the occasion present itself, each team could operate independently of the others; however, it would be able to remain in contact with other units operating up to a range of 1000 kilometers (23: 1209-10).

The next level of SPETsNAZ organization is the brigade. The brigade usually consists of a headquarters unit, an anti-VIP (very important persons) company, three to four parachute battalions, a signal company, and other supporting units. The brigade, which is 1000 to 1300 strong, can operate as a single unit, or can be subdivided into as many as 135 separate and independent groups. The anti-VIP company is, as its name implies, assassination-oriented. This company is the only company which is solely made up of full-time professional soldiers. The anti-VIP company is trained to seek out, identify, and kill, the enemy's military and political leadership. This company is always maintained at the highest

level of combat readiness and strength (7:69: 35:2).

The Soviet Navy, like its sister service, has SPETsNAZ elements within its structure. The Soviet naval SPETsNAZ brigade has a corresponding anti-VIP company, a group of midget submarines, two or three groups of combat swimmers, a battalion of parachutists, and the necessary supporting units. The naval SPETsNAZ regiments are composed of six to seven sabotage companies and have a strength of between 700 to 800 men assigned. These units are different than those of the independent companies and brigades in that these units are manned solely by professional athletes of Olympic caliber. It has even been suggested that the bulk of the modern Soviet Olympic athletes come from these SPETsNAZ units (7:69).

At the outbreak of hostilities the Soviet Union would have significant numbers of SPETsNAZ forces at its disposal. It is estimated there would be 41 independent companies (one allotted to every tank and all-arms army); 16 SPETsNAZ brigades (one to each front); four SPETsNAZ naval brigades (one assigned to each fleet); and, 20 SPETsNAZ intelligence units (one of which would be assigned to each front or naval fleet). In addition, the Soviets would have available three SPETsNAZ regiments which could be allotted to the Commanders-in-Chief of the Strategic Directions which consists of three or more fronts and a naval fleet (23:1209-11). The assignment of SPETsNAZ units to army and naval forces provides Soviet commanders valuable resources with which to proceed toward their objectives. The rapid advance of Soviet ground forces must have the coordinated efforts of both Soviet naval and air forces. To ensure success in attaining their objectives, surprise, shock, and pre-emption of an enemy's ability to neutralize their efforts must be initiated. Tactics used by the Soviets to prevent an enemy from thwarting their efforts will include the insertion of SPETsNAZ units to operate in the enemy's rear to disrupt or prevent his mobilization (12:35).

TACTICS

Conducting operations behind enemy lines has generated considerable attention from Soviet military planners, tacticians, and strategists. It is to this end that the Soviets have created a force of such size making it unequal to any other in prosecuting special operations behind the lines. These SPETsNAZ forces are well equipped, trained, and highly mobile. The en masse use of SPETsNAZ forces prior to the outset of all-out hostilities would, in all likelihood, be held in abeyance. Their massive employment prior to all-out hostilities would signal a warning to an enemy, thus negating the potential benefits of surprise, shock, and pre-emption (13:253).

The infiltration of SPETsNAZ forces into enemy territory, in a non-nuclear environment, would more than likely be under various ruses. As mentioned earlier, Soviet Olympic athletes come from SPETsNAZ units. "The SPETsNAZ regiments, which are manned entirely by professionals, are disguised as sporting teams belonging to the Central Army Sporting Club (ZSKA). The same method is used by the KGB, and professional KGB saboteurs belong to the Dinamo Sporting Club (23:1212)." Logically it would follow that since these are Olympic caliber athletes, they would travel to various capitals and other cities in countries where they could be expected to operate. This would afford them on-the-scene familiarity in that area. Noteworthy is the fact that women athletes comprise a significant percentage of the personnel assigned to SPETsNAZ units (24:32). At the time of this writing, it is also interesting to note that multi-media sources, both press and television, have reported that Dinamo was in the United States and Canada playing ice hockey (14:3A; 19:--).

The further infiltration of SPETsNAZ forces could be accomplished under the disguises of tourist and cultural groups, businessmen, delegations, or as passengers or crews of merchant ships or civil aircraft. The posting of SPETsNAZ personnel at embassies, trade missions, consulates, news agency offices, and as students at universities are just some of the ways these units can be infiltrated into enemy territory (7:73; 23:1215). Posing as truck drivers who cross international borders also facilitates entry. European customs agreements allow trucks bearing the "T.I.R." (Transports Internationaux Routiers) to cross international borders with minimum or no customs checks. These vehicles could easily carry personnel, weapons, and explosives, plus an assortment of equipment and materials necessary to project and support their initiative. In NATO countries, these vehicles freely travel throughout the countryside and into areas housing nearby military facilities (35:4). Unobtrusive, they provide a mobile distribution capability for prepositioning men and material in enemy rear area positions. Furthermore, these carriers can serve as platforms for intelligence collections, thus allowing frequent updating of potential targets.

The use of sleeper, deep cover or in-place SPETsNAZ sabotage agents in the enemy country would facilitate SPETsNAZ activity. These agents serve multi-purpose roles and are usually recruited from pro-Soviet countries or within the Soviet Union. One of their principles is not to draw attention to themselves; therefore, they are not active overt intelligence collectors. They assimilate into the communities where they live and undertake no activity which would bring them attention. In essence, they become, and are, members of the community. Their primary functions are to provide prompt response to GRU tasking by destroying transport and power facilities through use of

explosives. In addition, these agents will support SPETsNAZ units by providing needed concealment, supplies, food, fuel, transportation, and up-to-date intelligence on the local area. The use of these agents would prove beneficial to SPETsNAZ activities (23:1213).

The massive injection of SPETsNAZ forces would, in all likelihood, be by the fastest means possible--airlift. This is extremely risky because the aircraft could be detected by various radar systems. This type of employment tactic would, if detected, negate the desired surprise and shock and thus allow the defending forces some warning and mobilizing capability. Furthermore, it might allow him the ability to launch counterstrike actions via weapon systems that could have been destroyed had other insertion tactics been used (13:253). However, if SPETsNAZ saboteurs infiltrate by parachute from a commercial airliner or helicopter, in small numbers, their risks of detection are greatly reduced and their chances of success are greatly enhanced.

Although primary attention has been given to some of the various tactics of land based SPETsNAZ forces, Soviet naval SPETsNAZ units cannot not be ignored. Naval SPETsNAZ forces will infiltrate primarily through means of submarines and mini-submarines, inflatables, or by swimming (7:72-73). Swedish reports have amply displayed Soviet capability in the area of mini-submarines. During October 1982, six Soviet submarines were operating in Swedish waters. According to Swedish accounts, two were identified as mini-submarines. Indications were that these two mini-submarines were of different configurations in that "...one had tracks and a single propeller and that the other had a reinforced keel and twin propellers (23:1213)." The Swedish government also reported they had indications of a "...rendezvous between the tracked mini-submarine and a mother ship (23:1213)." The reasons for these intrusions into Swedish waters by the Soviets have not been publicly detailed. It could be assumed the Soviets gained valuable training and experience from these endeavors, as well as information of intelligence value. These episodes could have also given the Soviets valuable insight on how detectable these tactics are and whether or not their implementation, preceding or during actual conflict initiation, would be useful. Whatever the timing or exact use of these submarines and mini-submarines, the Soviets have demonstrated a capability to infiltrate naval SPETsNAZ forces into an enemy's territory.

The public reports of two Soviet defectors differ to a degree concerning what the order of target priorities will be once SPETsNAZ forces have been inserted into enemy territory (20:4; 23:1210). This is understandable as different units have different targets, and targets change based upon time, value, and threat. Soviet planners will be the ones who prioritize the

targets for the SPETsNAZ forces: however, regardless of the particular order, the following represents a viable sabotage target list for SPETsNAZ (12:36: 20:4; 23:1210):

- The location, destruction, or at least incapacitation, of the enemy's nuclear facilities and their means of delivery. This includes both strategic and tactical systems. The Pershing II and Ground Launched Cruise Missile (GLCM) are examples of tactical systems located in NATO which would be primary targets. The B-52 and B-1B bombers and Minuteman missile are strategic systems in the United States which would be of high priority.

- The destruction, or at least neutralization, of command centers, communication centers and lines of communication, and warning radars.

- Identification, location, and assassination of key military and political leaders. This task would also be accomplished by the KGB as it has to be presumed they would already be in the enemy's country under a multitude of various covers, which could include diplomatic, cultural exchange, news media representatives, and a variety of others.

- The destruction, or at least incapacitation, of key industrial targets and facilities, such as oil and gas storage sites, pipelines and pumping stations, power generation and transformer stations.

- The destruction of transportation facilities, such as key road and railroad transportation bottlenecks, bridges, and tunnels.

- The destruction of military facilities to include barracks, armories, supply storage areas, and other targets of opportunity.

- The capture of military personnel to gain uniforms so infiltration of military facilities might be more easily expedited to carry out sabotage activities. Brief interrogations of prisoners might occur for intelligence purposes; however, it can be assumed these prisoners would be quickly killed after they served their purpose or were of no use. An escaped prisoner could sound an alarm thus exposing SPETsNAZ activity.

- Creation of forest fires to divert enemy resources and cover SPETsNAZ re-enforcement.

- Destruction of enemy airfields and aircraft by independent action of SPETsNAZ saboteurs or identification and marking of their locations for destruction by Soviet missiles or aircraft.

This list is not designed to be all inclusive and it does not take into consideration the actions by Soviet naval SPETSNAZ units. SPETSNAZ sabotage forces will be directed against targets like those listed above, but they will also have other important tasks as well. Some of those tasks include determining the location and disposition of enemy forces and keeping their headquarters informed on enemy movement. One of their most important tasks is that of preparing landing sites for the insertion of the main airborne force behind enemy lines (20:4).

SPETSNAZ sabotage forces are designed to inflict as much death and destruction as possible on the opposing enemy, thus breaking his will and resolve to fight as a cohesive force. Operating behind enemy lines, as much as 1000 kilometers, enables SPETSNAZ to conduct their activities in the heartland of an enemy country. These actions divert or destroy material and resources which are needed for defensive and offensive actions. They also inhibit a country's ability to effectively mobilize and bring its military power to bear. The means and methods SPETSNAZ forces could use in creating this situation are varied, destructive, and deadly.

CHAPTER FIVE

PREPARING FOR, AND DOING, DIRTY DEEDS

TRAINING

For those who will make up SPETsNAZ units, the training is an arduous undertaking. Conscripts, who comprise the majority of these forces, undergo training normally lasting approximately six months. Since the SPETsNAZ forces are considered to be elite units, their ranks are manned accordingly with officers, warrant officers, and non-commissioned officers (NCOs). The conscripts who have the proven reliability, abilities, and potential for SPETsNAZ qualifications after initial training and screening are sent on to more stringent training at NCO schools where they will graduate as sergeants. Those individuals who washout of training in the NCO schools are returned to regular SPETsNAZ units as privates. If there are only a limited number of NCO slots for elite SPETsNAZ units, those NCOs who graduated lower in their course will be returned to regular SPETsNAZ units and form a ready made reserve force of trained NCOs who will replace those of the elite units as casualties occur of combat (7:71; 23:1212; 35:2).

The training SPETsNAZ troops undergo is diverse, intense, and as realistic as possible. Specialized courses are conducted in foreign languages such as German, French, English, Danish, Dutch, Italian. Other courses consist of parachute training, demolition, survival, infiltration techniques, sabotage, assassination techniques, reconnaissance techniques, and so on. In order to give the training as much realism as possible, the Soviets have constructed full-scale models of key targets such as military installations and various weapons systems. Examples of the types of full-scale models include: the Ground Launched Cruise Missile (GLCM), Lance, Pluton, and Pershing II missiles; allied aircraft such as the Mirage IV, Jaguars; nuclear storage sites, air defense installations, communication facilities, and airfields, plus an assortment of howitzer artillery pieces. These mock-ups, which include inflatables, are designed to give SPETsNAZ troops familiarity with NATO equipment and weapons and provide realistic demolition training (10:17.54-55; 20:4; 28:5-1 - 5-4; 34:73; 35:3.54-55).

The training of SPETsNAZ sabotage units is even more ruthless than that of the typical SPETsNAZ unit. "The saboteurs

are trained to live under the most difficult conditions, learning how to survive with minimum supplies of food and water (20:4)." The training runs the gamut from physical conditioning, political indoctrination, and combat applications to the psychological aspects of warfare. Particularly noteworthy is the training SPETsNAZ sabotage units receive regarding the enemy's tactics and methods of interrogation should they be captured. Coupled with the rigors of their training, ruthlessness is ingrained into each and every soldier (20:4).

Anyone who might betray their position or prevent them carrying out their tasks must be killed, since they cannot take prisoners. Even women, children or old people who stumble across them in a wood [sic] must not be allowed to report their discovery, and the saboteurs are told to kill without any pangs of conscience in order to do their duty. Any "sentimental" feelings must be disregarded, and they must think of themselves as being above such "rubbish" (20:4).

Much training for SPETsNAZ sabotage forces is done in the Soviet Union; however, training within Warsaw Pact countries is also conducted. A Soviet SPETsNAZ reconnaissance-sabotage battalion located in East Germany is particularly large. This allows training under conditions it would encounter in Western countries. The units trained in East Germany are primarily trained for sabotage actions in Belgium, Britain, Holland, and West Germany. "There are about 150 sabotage groups trained to operate in Western Europe, and each has a carefully determined role to play which is kept strictly secret in peacetime (20:5)." Immediately prior to the outbreak of hostilities, the group commander is issued a sealed packet containing detailed instructions, maps, and other documents on which to proceed. It has been reported that certain groups assigned to this force have been trained in the use of atomic mines (20:5).

Naval SPETsNAZ forces receive the same intensive training with naval related targets. Warsaw Pact troops of the same design would likewise have similar missions and training (12:37-39; 23:1215).

Separate from these reconnaissance-sabotage battalions, the Soviet Army maintains other special purpose sabotage detachments which bear special mention. One detachment, code-named the "Five-Hundredth Detachment" (Pyatisotv otrvad), has been specifically trained to sabotage primary seaports of the United States and other NATO countries. Ports such as New York, London, Rotterdam, and Hamburg, as well as other strategic locations have been identified as targets for this detachment. Reportedly, all groups assigned to this detachment have been trained to use atomic mines and other special weapons (20:4-5).

The training SPETsNAZ forces receive equips them well to carry out their sabotage mission. The methods they will use will depend on many factors, such as timing, distance and location, desired result, target priority, difficulty of target to access, as well as physical hardness of the target. A diversity of sabotage methods are known to be well within the Soviet capability to project and achieve. In many instances success will depend on the expertise of the saboteur and the means he or she uses to carry out their act.

METHODS OF SABOTAGE

Assassination is one of the most shocking and singly brutal forms of sabotage which can cause public panic. The Soviets have demonstrated their capability in this area with the assassination of Afghanistan's President Amin and several of his officers in December 1979. A primary mission for SPETsNAZ sabotage forces will be locating, identifying, and assassinating key political and military leaders. The KGB would also take part in this type of activity. A P6 9mm silenced pistol, with which all SPETsNAZ forces are equipped, or the new 5.45mm PRI automatic pistol could be used, although other means are also available. Assassination of part of the leadership infrastructure, whether political or military, would cause public chaos and a lack of confidence in the government to protect itself and its citizens, and would impede the enemy's ability to rapidly mobilize its forces (7:71; 22:3; 23:1209-12.1216).

The use of incendiaries could be used in a multitude of roles, whether against military or civilian targets. The creation of forest fires can divert large numbers of manpower, disrupt communication and transportation routes, clear potential landing areas for large scale airborne troop drops, and cause chaos among the population trying to escape the fires. In addition, the smoke generated from these fires could cover follow-on SPETsNAZ reinforcements. Incendiaries could also be used on specific military targets such as supply storage areas, barracks, fuel storage and pumping facilities as well as other targets (12:36; 20:4). The use of these types of devices could deprive an enemy of needed material resources, divert the attention of security forces, and cause disruption of required activity. Incendiaries are particularly useful sabotage tools because they require immediate attention, less the fires they create get totally out of control.

Explosives constitute another sabotage device readily available to SPETsNAZ forces. Explosives could be the primary sabotage tool due to the numerous targets they can be directed toward. Using explosives provides almost limitless possibilities. Soft, semi-hard, and hardened targets could be

vulnerable to this type of method. The use of explosive-type projectiles are included in this category. Airfields, railway lines, road and rail bridges, communication lines and centers, command centers, early warning radars, control radar systems, power facilities, fuel storage and pipelines, plus numerous other systems and facilities are vulnerable to this type of sabotage. As an example, explosives could have a devastating effect on delivery systems. It would be logical that SPETsNAZ sabotage forces would want to destroy GLCM, Pershing II, and other land based mobile systems while they were garrisoned or prior to deployment. This is a time when retaliatory forces are concentrated and vulnerable. Although a direct attack on these systems in this configuration may be extremely costly to SPETsNAZ, it would be conducted. If missiles were found in a deployed configuration, again an all-out attack might be conducted even against extreme odds. "It is believed that a sudden attack (even if unsuccessful) may cause the enemy to cancel the launch, or postpone it in order to recheck all systems and equipment (23:1215)." If the sabotage groups discover the missile ready for firing from its launcher they would try to destroy it from a distance using grenade-launchers or sniper rifle fire (23:1215; 35:3-4). Since all SPETsNAZ sabotage troops are trained in the use of explosives, the emphasis the Soviets place on this method of destruction should not be underestimated (7:68; 20:4). There is, however, a distinct possibility SPETsNAZ sabotage forces might not be able to penetrate the defenses or perimeter of a facility which is hardened or otherwise protected. This being the case they would not be able to place their explosive charges directly on the target and destroy it. If this situation were encountered it is entirely conceivable they would place offset navigational beacons or homing devices in a predetermined configuration in the target area which would allow for follow-on air attack or perhaps missile targeting if warranted. Although SPETsNAZ saboteurs may not physically destroy or damage the target themselves, the end results could be the same.

Destruction by acids and abrasives constitute another means for sabotage by SPETsNAZ (35:2). The use of abrasives through petroleum, oil, and lubricants in engines and motors can quickly degrade their efficiency or complete operation. Conducted in the rear areas, this can severely effect the enemy in his ability to mobilize. Sabotage methods such as this also add to further confusing the enemy when conducted with other sabotage actions. In addition, the use of acids on electrical components, metal structures and supports, plus innumerable other materials and supplies provide a viable method for interrupting the enemy's ability to conduct warfare. In many cases quick fixes may not be available because the residual effects of these acids can further perplex the enemy.

The ability of SPETsNAZ sabotage teams to conduct biological

attacks cannot be discounted. As Secretary of Defense Caspar W. Weinberger's report on Soviet military power indicates:

Soviet research efforts in the area of genetic engineering may also have a connection with their biological warfare program. There is an apparent effort on the part of the Soviets to transfer selected aspects of genetic engineering research to their biological warfare centers. For biological warfare purposes, genetic engineering could open a large number of possibilities. Normally harmless, non-disease producing organisms could be modified to become highly toxic or produce diseases for which an opponent has no known treatment or cure. Other agents, now considered too unstable for storage or biological warfare applications, could be changed sufficiently to be an effective agent (33:73).

Soviet scientists who are now living in the United States, and formerly worked directly with microbiology in the Soviet Union, reported the Soviets are using recombinant deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) for military application (11:36-38; 26:59-60). These scientists also reported that specific efforts by the Soviets involved attempts "...to recombine the venom-producing genes from cobra snakes with ordinary viruses and bacteria; such an organism would infect the body and surreptitiously produce paralytic cobra neurotoxin (17:30)." In addition to these reports, Soviet military writings give credence to the "...effectiveness and reliability of such weapons due to the advances of biotechnology and describes how these germ weapons might be used in combat or for 'sabotage' purposes (17:30)."

The use of these types of weapons by SPETSNAZ sabotage forces in the enemy's rear areas is a distinct possibility. Placed near airfields, weapons storage areas, marshalling areas, troop concentrations, bivouac areas, troops garrisons or barracks, and others, these sabotage agents pose a viable threat.

The use of biological and chemical weapons is not a modern phenomena for the Soviet Union. Ever since World War I, when Russian losses totaled over a half-million due to German gas attacks, the Soviets have been placing increased emphasis on biological and chemical warfare. "Lenin established the country's first bacteriological weapons institute in 1919, and work on chemical and biological warfare has progressed unceasingly (17:30)."

"The armed forces of the Soviet Union are better equipped, structured, and trained than any other military force in the world to conduct offensive and defensive chemical warfare

(27:16-3)." NATO intelligence believe the Soviets have over 300,000 tons of chemical weapons stored for use. These are divided below into four categories:

- Hydrogen cyanide - a quick acting blood agent which is fatal with two or three breaths.
- Sarin (GB) - a nerve agent which causes central nervous system failure and is fatal within minutes.
- Thickened Soman (TGD) - which is usually air dropped as a chemical rain and contaminates the ground, is absorbed through the skin, and causes death shortly thereafter.
- Mustard/Lewisite mix - similar to mustard gas, but is seldom fatal; however, it causes serious wounds and blistering for which there is no known cure.

These are just a few of the categories of chemicals available to SPETsNAZ forces for their sabotage actions (9:9; 27:16-4 - 5; 30:7). Although these chemicals could have a severely adverse effect on an enemy, the Soviets would have to contend with them as well if they advanced into the contaminated area. This does not appear to be that much of a problem, however, as the Soviets have been using both toxins and chemicals in Afghanistan since 1979 and mycotoxins since 1980 (31:3-4). The battlefields of Afghanistan, plus Soviet connections in Laos, Kampuchea, and Vietnam are providing the Soviets true wartime conditions in chemical training and experience for future conflicts (30:4-30; 31:3-12). It is the author's contention that, to believe the Soviets SPETsNAZ would not engage in chemical warfare through sabotage operations would be to delude ourselves into a false sense of security and trust.

The use of nuclear weapons as a sabotage device should not be discounted. Defectors have described SPETsNAZ sabotage groups as receiving training in the use of atomic landmines (20:6). Their application would be based on the priorities selected by Soviet planners. Logic allows that their priorities would be nuclear delivery systems to include hardened facilities, mobile land systems and aircraft, primary headquarters, command and control facilities, prepared defensive positions, troop concentrations, nuclear storage facilities, communications centers, and others. Naval SPETsNAZ forces would likewise have corresponding targets (12:36; 27:16-2). With the advance of technology, nuclear weapons are becoming more compact, thus, more transportable. The use of nuclear weapons by SPETsNAZ would provide widespread shock and surprise with little or no warning, as the weapons and saboteurs would have most likely infiltrated into enemy territory undetected. Again, only Soviet planners know what methods will be employed under a given scenario.

Some US analysts suggest that, in a European scenario, the Soviets would not destroy the Ballistic Missile Early Warning System (BMEWS) in order to assure US leaders the Soviets were not launching nuclear missiles towards the US (12:36.40-41). A premise to consider with this type of analysis relates to the Soviet doctrine of destroying the bulk of NATO's tactical nuclear force prior to the advent of all-out hostilities. The Soviet strategy would imply they could possibly dissuade NATO from using its remaining nuclear forces because of Soviet nuclear superiority in the theater (5:306). If this, in fact, would be the case, the use of SPETsNAZ sabotage units would be the precursor to attempts to destroy, neutralize, or at least temporarily immobilize portions of NATO's nuclear force. The extent of success these SPETsNAZ saboteurs would achieve, at least initially, would swing the advantage towards the Soviets. This advantage would be difficult to overcome.

The Soviets have a multitude of diverse sabotage methods they could, and would, employ from pre-hostilities through conflict resolution. The methods described above represent only a portion of the techniques available. The training SPETsNAZ forces receive in employing and exploiting these methods are comprehensive and well supported. They have displayed their willingness to use various sabotage techniques in the past, the 1979 assassination of Afghanistan President Amin is the best example, and no doubt will use them in the future. To believe the Soviets would not employ all manners of sabotage available to them leads to a false sense of security and a denial of Soviet doctrine.

CHAPTER SIX

ARE WE READY, WILLING, AND ABLE?

The previous chapters have described the SPETsNAZ threat. The purpose of this chapter is to address the question we need to continually ask ourselves. Are we ready, willing, and able to counter this threat? The answers are not easy, but the question must be constantly addressed.

To thwart the SPETsNAZ sabotage threat requires a realistic countersabotage doctrine which is complimented by definitive guidance and "living" action plans. This approach coupled with a continuing education of security forces on sabotage methods, tactics, and means of detection, should be linked to training in anti-sabotage procedures. The establishment of a viable source system which is tailored toward the sabotage threat is requisite to countering that type of activity (36:35-40). The development of questions and answers will lead to questions and answers, but this is a beginning. Countering this threat requires research and action. Are we ready, willing, and able?

The Soviet sabotage threat, whether by SPETsNAZ or other Soviet services or Warsaw Pact members, manifests a serious threat to the US and her allies. This is a threat which should not be taken lightly because it represents a clear and ever present danger to our military force capability and civilian environment. It is through our military posture of strength, readiness, and resolve that we are able to deter aggressive Soviet behavior. It is a posture we can never allow to diminish. Are we ready, willing, and able?

But what if our strength and our readiness were degraded to the extent they would not allow us to respond to the Soviet threat or their aggressive actions? What would happen then? Postulations can be made, but that is not the point of this paper. We need to recognize, understand, and prevent those hostile actions that could reduce our capability to respond to these challenges. What precursor could the Soviets put forth on the US and her allies to place them in a position which might negate their full potential in a response? The answer is sabotage. Sabotage would be a significant factor in negating a full retaliatory capability. Are we ready, willing, and able to prevent or at least minimize its impact?

Recognizing the vast potential of SPETsNAZ sabotage capabilities can be a cornerstone on which to prepare for preventing or moderating their impact. The Soviets have shown they are fully capable of imposing their will when the conditions favor their success. They act quickly, ruthlessly, and without restraint. Czechoslovakia and Afghanistan are testimony to Soviet aggressiveness. In each case, SPETsNAZ sabotage forces played a key role in securing the Soviet objective: Are we ready, willing, and able to think like a Soviet saboteur when it comes to protecting ourselves?

In response to this Soviet capability, the US and her allies have to identify and shore up their vulnerable areas. Can we defend GLCM, Pershing II, our airfields, nuclear storage areas, prepositioned war materials, control radars and communications in NATO? What about our B-52s, B-1Bs, Minuteman missile sites, early warning detections systems, and our military and civilian leadership? Can they be successfully defended against sabotage? Are we ready, willing, and able to take the time to train to defend these resources against a coordinated sabotage action? Hopefully, we are. SPETsNAZ saboteurs practice on full-scale models of many of those systems mentioned, plus more. Are we ready, willing, and able to neutralize, or at least minimize, the impact of their training?

As stated at the outset of this chapter, the answers to countering this threat do not come easily, but require diligent and constant efforts. The solutions will not come swiftly, but require time, imagination, and work. Are we ready, willing, and able to protect and defend the freedoms we so jealously guard? We cannot be deluded into a false sense of security because the Soviets have returned to the arms negotiations tables in Geneva, and heads of state talks have again occurred. The Soviets do not compromise unless they can gain in the process. We must be ever watchful. To do less could be catastrophic. Negotiations with the Soviets should not be based on the recognition of Soviet intentions, but rather, recognition of Soviet power. Sabotage is one form of power the Soviets can, and will, project through their SPETsNAZ forces. We must be ready, willing, and able.

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